• Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization;volume 184, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-02-14)
      We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill ...
    • Partial information disclosure in a contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Economics Letters;Volume 204, July 2021, 109915, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-05-18)
      Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing ...